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I n a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, peers are ex-pected to contribute to the system by shar-ing their resources in return for using the 
network and other peers’ resources. However, in 
many P2P networks, a considerable portion of 
peers are reluctant to share resources. Thus, P2P 
networks’ primary expectation — peers’ implicit 
or explicit functional cooperation and resource 
contribution — might fail, leading to a situation 
called free riding. In a P2P context, a free rid-
er is a peer that uses P2P network services but 
doesn’t contribute to the network or other peers 
at an acceptable level.
Eytan Adar and Bernardo A. Huberman per-
formed the first study specifically addressing 
the free-riding problem.1 The authors reported 
that 70 percent of peers didn’t share any files 
at all, and 25 percent provided 99 percent of 
all query hits in the network. Since then, many 
studies have verified that high degrees of free 
riding exist in P2P networks. As these works 
show, for some types of P2P networks (such as 
file sharing), a few altruistic peers can provide 
the requested services and might help the system 
survive. However, not all P2P networks (such as 
multimedia streaming and storage sharing net-
works) will have enough voluntary or altruistic 
peers to achieve the desired level of service. So, 
eliminating or reducing free riding’s impact has 
become a topic of considerable research. Here, 
we examine the free-riding problem in P2P 
networks and elaborate on various proposed 
solutions.
P2P Network Types
Free riding’s impact and the effectiveness of a 
solution to it depend on the P2P network in ques-
tion, so we should first examine various types of 
networks that exist. We can classify such net-
works according to many criteria. One possible 
classification is based on two network features: 
the degree of centralization and the degree of 
structure. The former determines to what extent 
a P2P network relies on servers to assist interac-
tions between peers, whereas the latter refers to 
the way in which content is indexed and located 
in the network. Using these two criteria, we can 
classify P2P networks into three types: central-
ized, decentralized but structured (hybrid), and 
decentralized and unstructured (pure). Central-
ized P2P networks maintain a central directory 
that is constantly updated; peers use this direc-
tory to locate resources (as with Napster). Hybrid 
P2P networks don’t have a central directory but 
are structured — that is, hybrid P2P networks 
firmly control the P2P topology and systemati-
cally place file indices into peers, following a 
certain algorithm (as with Chord, the Content-
Addressable Network, or Pastry). In this way, 
the network can efficiently resolve queries. Pure 
P2P networks have no centralized directory, and 
these networks have little control over the net-
work topology (as with Gnutella or KaZaa).
Another possible classification regards the 
type of services a P2P network provides. File 
sharing is the most widespread P2P service and 
lets peers search and download files from oth-
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er peers connected to the network 
(as with Napster, Gnutella, Publius, 
Free Haven, or BitTorrent). Distrib-
uted computing, on the other hand, 
lets peers aggregate their computing 
power to solve a large and computa-
tionally intensive problem. SETI@
home, Avaki, and Entropia are well-
known examples in this category. 
P2P storage services provide virtual 
stable storage via redundancy and 
aim to allow peers to continuously 
access files while preserving author 
anonymity; OceanStore, PAST (a 
global, persistent storage  utility), and 
FreeNet are examples of such sys-
tems. Collaborative P2P applications 
enable application-level collaboration 
among peers. These applications (such 
as NetMeeting, Magi, Groove, Jabber, 
and DOOM) include instant messag-
ing, chats, and online games. P2P 
platforms (for example, JXTA) sup-
port common P2P services, such as 
naming, discovery, communication, 
security, and resource aggregation. 
Finally, P2P multimedia streaming 
services (for example, PPLive, UU-
See, Peercast, and Freecast) let peers 
stream and multicast or broadcast 
audio and video to each other.
Free Riding’s Impact
Free riding can adversely affect a P2P 
network’s operation. In a free-riding 
environment, a small number of peers 
serve a large population, which can 
lead to scalability and single-point-
of-failure problems. Free riders and 
their queries generate substantial 
network traffic, which might lead to 
service degradation. Furthermore, 
free riders occupy considerable un-
derlying available network capacity 
and resources, causing delays and 
congestion for non-P2P traffic.
How serious free riding’s effects 
are on a P2P network depends on 
many factors, including the network 
type and its requirements. In a file-
sharing P2P network, for example, if 
most peers prefer not to share, renew-
al or presentation of interesting con-
tent might decrease with time; thus, 
the number of shared files can be-
come limited or only increase slowly. 
The search process’s quality might 
degrade due to an increasing number 
of free riders in the search horizon. 
With time, honest peers who have 
contributed many files to the net-
work might begin to find fewer and 
fewer worthwhile files themselves 
and leave the system altogether, tak-
ing their files with them.
In a P2P CPU-sharing grid (a dis-
tributed computing system), free rid-
ing can easily decrease system utility 
or even make the system collapse 
due to insufficient CPU resources. 
Similarly, in media-streaming sys-
tems, peers gain utility not only 
from file availability but also from 
high-quality file streams.2 Although 
a conventional file-sharing system 
might persist even with low-level 
cooperation, a P2P streaming system 
can’t offer high streaming quality to 
its users if only a relatively few users 
cooperate. Even though the network 
isn’t heavily congested, if coopera-
tion is low, streaming quality will 
be poor.2 Similarly, applications de-
veloped to run over P2P platforms or 
services that collaboration networks 
provide fail to execute properly if the 
network doesn’t achieve the required 
cooperation level.
Structured P2P networks can be 
more vulnerable to some types of 
free riding than unstructured ones. 
In a structured P2P network that 
uses the CAN protocol, for example, 
peers must store key-value pairs for 
keys that fall into their zone. Within 
the CAN context, peers can free ride 
by not storing key-value pairs in 
their zones and by ignoring incom-
ing queries. If most peers do this, 
CAN can’t resolve most queries, and 
the network might easily fall apart.
Ultimately, free riding’s effects 
can range from simply annoying us-
ers to crashing the whole system. So, 
P2P system developers should shape 
solutions to deal with free riding 
according to the expected impact it 
will have. 
Methods to  
Combat Free Riding
Although cooperation is key to many 
P2P networks’ existence and success, 
realizing it is difficult without effec-
tive mechanisms. To address this re-
quirement, researchers have proposed 
several approaches to make P2P net-
works “contribution-aware” and thus 
combat free riding. We can catego-
rize these approaches into three main 
groups: monetary-, reciprocity-, and 
reputation-based approaches.
Monetary-Based Approaches
Monetary-based approaches charge 
peers for the services they receive. 
Because these services are still very 
low cost, such approaches are also 
called micropayment-based solu-
tions. Any monetary-based system 
requires two key mechanisms: an 
accounting module to securely store 
each peer’s virtual currency and a 
settlement module to fairly exchange 
virtual currency for services. Most 
monetary-based systems implement 
these components by centralizing 
their functions within a single au-
thority, which manages each peer’s 
balance and transactions by track-
ing accounts and distributing and 
cashing virtual currency. Most of 
the proposed solutions depend on a 
public-key infrastructure (PKI) to 
provide security against fraud and 
errors. We discuss security concerns 
more in a later section.
When monetary-based solutions 
deal with only small payments, 
any incorporated security mecha-
nisms need only be lightweight.3 
Most monetary-based solutions don’t 
guarantee a totally fair exchange 
of goods and payment, however,3 
because tight security services can 
make transactions more expensive 
(in terms of complexity, computa-
tion, and communications) than the 
exchanged goods’ value. Thus, effec-
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tive monetary-based systems simply 
require “good enough” security, in 
which fraud is detectable, traceable, 
and unprofitable, while preserving 
high efficiency.
P2P networks can implement mon-
etary-based approaches using two dif-
ferent payment methods: online and 
offline. In online payment methods, 
virtual currency exchange occurs at 
the same time as peers receive ser-
vices. This solution can prevent most 
payment frauds. To apply this method, 
the central authority must be online 
at the moment of transaction.
Conversely, with offline payment 
methods, P2P networks can execute 
payment after services are exchanged 
whenever the central authority is 
available. This might require peers 
to use permanent identification. Fur-
thermore, because payments occur 
offline, a P2P network might not dis-
cover coin fraud (using a counterfeit 
currency) until after the fact. Still, 
P2P network developers might prefer 
offline payment methods from a prac-
tical standpoint because use of off-
line payment methods involves lower 
communication and computational 
costs and lower latency. Researchers 
have proposed various monetary-
based approaches in the context of 
P2P networks, such as PPAY,3 and 
online and offline Karma.4
Monetary-based approaches have 
several implementation limitations 
when applied to P2P networks.
Centralization and communication 
over head. All proposed solutions 
require some centralized authority 
to monitor each peer’s balance and 
transactions. This can cause scal-
ability and single-point-of-failure 
problems, as mentioned. Addition-
ally, disseminating virtual curren-
cies, managing transactions, and 
applying auditing mechanisms in-
crease communication overhead in 
the network.
Persistent identifiers. To store peer 
balances and manage transactions, 
monetary-based approaches require 
persistent user identifiers. Providing 
such identifiers, however, is com-
plicated by peers’ anonymity, wide 
dispersion, and ease of identity modi-
fication in most unstructured and de-
centralized P2P networks. We discuss 
this issue more in a later section.
Mental transaction costs. Users dis-
like micropayments primarily be-
cause they must decide before each 
service request whether the service 
is worth a few cents, which leads to 
confusion and mental decision costs. 
Thus, monetary-based solutions in-
volve users’ mental effort in ex-
change for inexpensive resources.
Reciprocity-Based Approaches
In reciprocity-based approaches, a 
peer monitors other peers’ behav-
iors and evaluates their contribu-
tion levels. We can define a peer’s 
contribution level as a numerical 
assessment of that peer’s contribu-
tion to the P2P network or to the 
assessing peer. These approaches 
usually involve a mutual action: 
the service quality a peer receives 
is determined by that peer’s con-
tribution level. Reciprocity- based 
approaches usually measure other 
peers’ contributions only for the 
current session. These approach-
es maintain no long-term history 
about peers, which lets a peer that’s 
judged as a free rider in one session 
be judged as a contributor in the 
next, provided the peer has changed 
its behavior. These approaches also 
let the system preserve peer ano-
nymity because using persistent 
identifiers isn’t mandatory.
Reciprocity-based approaches can 
be based on mutual reciprocity or in-
direct reciprocity. With mutual reci-
procity, a peer decides how to serve 
another peer based solely on the 
direct service exchange it had with 
this peer. In contrast, with indirect 
reciprocity, this decision depends on 
the level of services a peer provides 
to the whole network.
Some existing P2P  applications, 
such as BitTorrent, implement the 
mutual reciprocity-based approach 
by adjusting a peer’s download 
speed according to its upload speed 
(requiring downloading and up-
loading peers to exchange file frag-
ments). Other examples of mutual 
reciprocity-based approaches are 
FairNET,5 the P2P Connection Man-
agement Protocol,6 and eMule (www.
emule-project.net), which uses a 
cross-credit system. When peer A 
uploads a file to peer B, peer A gets 
a credit from peer B, which will then 
privilege peer A in case it wants to 
download a file from peer B in the 
future.
Indirect reciprocity-based ap-
proaches consider peers’ overall con-
tribution to the network when 
differentiating service provisioning. 
For example, we suggest a distributed 
monitoring and punishment scheme 
elsewhere7 in which each peer moni-
tors its neighbors’ contribution to the 
network. Depending on the contribu-
tion level, the peer applies an action 
to each neighbor. GNUnet also falls 
into this category: in GNUnet (http://
gnunet.org), peers monitor each oth-
ers’ behavior with respect to resource 
usage. Peers that contribute to the 
network receive better service.
Reciprocity-based approaches face 
several implementation issues.
Fake services. To gain higher levels 
of contribution, peers can publish 
fake services.
Contribution-level credibility. Some 
proposed reciprocity-based meth-
ods depend on accurate information 
about peers, but peers themselves 
provide this information. A mali-
cious user can cheat a P2P network 
that depends on such an approach by 
hacking the client program.
Peer identity management. Peers 
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are linked to their values through 
their identities. However, if new-
comers are assigned a higher stan-
dard utility value than are free 
riders, a free rider can try to get rid 
of its degraded value by constantly 
getting a new identity.
Reputation-Based Approaches
Reputation-based approaches con-
struct and maintain reputation infor-
mation about peers, and peers with 
good reputations are offered better 
services. These approaches can con-
struct reputation information about 
a peer on the basis of feedback from 
peers who have interacted with that 
peer. Such feedback can be positive, 
negative, or both. The system uses 
the feedback to build up a good rep-
utation for contributing peers and a 
bad reputation for free riders. 
A peer’s reputation information 
corresponds to its long-term behav-
ior, so reputation-based approaches 
store and manage long-term peer 
histories. This implies that it isn’t 
easy to convert a bad reputation to a 
good one or vice versa. 
We can categorize reputation-
based methods into two main groups: 
autonomous reputation approaches 
and global reputation approaches.
In an autonomous reputation 
scheme, peers maintain reputation 
information about other peers they’ve 
interacted with. These local reputa-
tion values aren’t disseminated or 
merged to create a global reputation 
database. Consequently, such ap-
proaches are relatively simple to im-
plement because they don’t call for a 
security infrastructure or centralized 
storage to protect local reputations’ 
integrity. XRep is an example of an 
autonomous reputation system.8
Global reputation-based approach-
es aggregate the reputation informa-
tion obtained from several peers or 
all peers. Such approaches store this 
consolidated reputation information 
either at a central location or with a 
set of peers in the network. Various 
methods exist for distributing and 
accessing reputation information in 
the network. One method is to pig-
gyback reputation values onto P2P 
protocol messages. This is called a 
gossip mechanism: the receiving peer 
decides whether to use such gossip to 
create a consolidated reputation value 
for a given peer. Unlike gossip mech-
anisms, an explicit mechanism lets a 
peer retrieve others’ reputations from 
the system through a P2P protocol. 
Global reputation approaches 
speed up free rider identification, 
especially when the peer population 
is large and the chance of direct in-
teraction with the same peer is low, 
because peers can learn from others’ 
interactions. These approaches also 
provide more reliable and long-term 
reputation information about peers. 
EigenTrust9 is an example of a glob-
al reputation system. In EigenTrust, 
in addition to local values stored at 
each peer, the global reputation de-
rived from multiple local values is 
stored at random peers. 
We must consider several impor-
tant issues when implementing rep-
utation-based solutions.
Reputation reliability. Reputation sys-
tems assume that peers report their 
interactions with other peers honest-
ly and impartially. However, a peer 
can cheat the system and cost other 
peers by misreporting the services it 
receives from them.
Centralization and communication 
overhead. A global reputation system 
might rely on a centralized author-
ity to store and manage reputation 
information. This is difficult to im-
plement in pure P2P networks and 
can also cause scalability problems. 
Moreover, to exchange and consoli-
date reputation information, peers 
must communicate with each other, 
a centralized authority, or a special 
group of peers, which increases con-
trol traffic in the P2P network.
Persistent identifiers. Because peers’ 
identities should be preserved across 
sessions to store long-term histo-
ries, implementing reputation-based 
 approaches in anonymous systems 
is difficult. Similarly, preserving 
anonymity in systems implement-
ing  reputation-based approaches is 
difficult.
Open Issues
Many researchers have developed 
appropriate solutions to the free-
 riding problem. However, certain is-
sues still remain.
Common Attacks or Cheats
Free riders might try to work 
around free-riding solutions, if do-
ing so increases their benefits from 
the system. Researchers designing 
mechanisms to combat free riding 
should consider the nature of these 
attacks.9–11 Let’s look at some com-
mon attacks against free-riding 
solutions.
Collusion. We can define collusion as 
collaborative activity of a group of 
free riders that gives group members 
benefits they couldn’t gain as indi-
viduals. A group of malicious peers 
Reputation sys tems assume that peers 
report their interactions honestly. A peer can 
cheat the system and cost other peers by 
misreporting the services it receives from them.
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can attempt to collectively challenge 
and fool free-riding mechanisms. For 
instance, a group of free riders can 
collude to promote one or more free-
riding peers in the group or to dam-
age a contributing peer’s reputation. 
Thus, they can evade detection by 
exploiting feedback mechanisms.
Modifying virtual currency, contribu-
tion, or reputation value. A cheater 
might exaggerate its virtual curren-
cy, contribution, or reputation value 
by providing incorrect information 
about itself. Cheaters can do this by, 
for example, modifying client pro-
grams, cracking locally saved values, 
or modifying a transaction record. 
To prevent such attacks, systems can 
implement credit and transaction-
record audit mechanisms via P2P 
protocols, as proposed elsewhere.11 
Such mechanisms can detect when 
a peer modifies its value and reverse 
the action. Other solutions are to use 
a voting scheme to collect opinions 
about a peer, implement heuristics 
to find groups of potentially mali-
cious voters, or apply a distributed 
cryptographic infrastructure, such 
as a PKI.
Fake services and new content. 
Many solutions proposed for free rid-
ing ignore the issue of fake services, 
content cheating, or the lack of new 
content provisioning. For example, 
in a file-sharing P2P network, a free 
riding peer can share some files with 
fake filenames that resemble more 
popular ones. If other peers down-
load these files, the free riding peer’s 
contribution value might increase. 
To deal with this problem, some ex-
isting P2P clients, such as eMule and 
eDonkey, use peer interaction to ver-
ify service quality and identify fake 
services. However, these applica-
tions experience low peer participa-
tion in service evaluation. Similarly, 
new content is essential for any P2P 
file-sharing system’s popularity and 
long evity. So, solutions should also 
aim to promote or enforce new con-
tent contribution from peers.
Whitewashing. In most current P2P 
networks, a peer’s real-world iden-
tification isn’t bound to its online 
identity, and joining the network and 
obtaining an online identity is free. 
This lets the network grow rapidly 
because newcomers can easily join 
the system. Cheaters can use this 
fact to repeatedly change their on-
line identities and thus have all the 
advantages and rights of a newcom-
er. This is called whitewashing. One 
technique researchers propose for 
combating whitewashing is to attach 
a high cost to acquiring new identi-
ties for all newcomers — for exam-
ple, using proof-of-work protocols.12 
The main idea behind these proto-
cols is that a prover demonstrates to 
a verifier that it has expended a cer-
tain level of computational effort in 
a specified time interval. However, 
as investigated elsewhere,10 imple-
menting such a solution should be 
adaptive with respect to newcomer 
turnover rates and the existing P2P 
community’s contribution level. If 
the turnover rate is high, this solu-
tion imposes a high cost on the P2P 
community, but if the community’s 
contribution level is high and the 
newcomer turnover rate is relatively 
low, the system can tolerate new-
comers by imposing a small cost. 
Another measure to combat white-
washers uses free but irreplaceable 
pseudonyms for peers, via a trusted 
central authority to assign them 
persistent identities. An irreplace-
able pseudonym for a peer could be, 
for example, the unique medium ac-
cess control (MAC) address for the 
computer the peer is using.
Replay and spoofing attacks. In a 
replay attack, free riders reuse a 
message another peer previously 
sent, which appears to be valid to 
other peers. Similarly, in spoofing 
attacks, cheaters construct mes-
sages that seem to originate from 
another peer. If the P2P protocol 
accepts them as valid, cheaters can 
benefit — for example, by gaining 
positive feedback or payments as if 
they contribute to the network. P2P 
protocols that assemble message 
elements simply by concatenating 
them are prone to such attacks. To 
prevent them, P2P protocols should 
validate P2P messages by perform-
ing proper checks before they’re ac-
cepted as legitimate. For instance, 
peers can sign messages with the 
session ID and their private keys. 
However, implementing such a solu-
tion requires P2P networks to have 
a cryptographic infrastructure.
Securing Free-Riding Solutions
A robust and long-term free-riding 
solution must consider the possibil-
ity of the previously mentioned at-
tacks and should incorporate security 
mechanisms that can successfully 
deal with them. However, deploying 
security mechanisms in P2P networks 
is difficult owing to the P2P paradigm’s 
characteristics, such as anonymity, de-
centralization, self-organization, and 
frequent disconnections.
Because newcomers can easily join the system, 
cheaters can use this fact to repeatedly change 
their online identities and thus have all the 
advantages and rights of a newcomer.
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Most security solutions used in 
global-scale networks require  using 
public keys for authentication, shared 
secret establishment, or integrity 
checking, and thus depend on a PKI. 
In the P2P context, directly imple-
menting PKIs can be troublesome 
because they require considerable 
resources to plan, install, deploy, 
and maintain. Furthermore, the huge 
number of users and high turnover 
in P2P networks make key manage-
ment a challenge in itself. Finally, 
pure P2P networks don’t have any 
central management, which makes 
standard PKI implementation based 
on a certification authority (CA) hi-
erarchy difficult.
One possible alternative to PKI’s 
centralized CA approach is to de-
centralize the certification process, 
as with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), 
a web-of-trust model in which no 
central CA exists. Peers can issue 
certificates and trust to each other 
in varying degrees. Hence, peers 
themselves decide the level of trust 
and the level of security. In PGP, 
peers can store certifications of oth-
er peers that they choose to trust. 
Then, they can exchange this col-
lection of certifying signatures with 
each other. Gradually, a decentral-
ized web of trust for public keys and 
peer identities emerges. However, 
identifying peers for services that 
require anonymity is still an issue. 
Another possible problem in imple-
menting this mechanism in a real 
P2P environment can be collusion 
attacks, in which malicious peers 
inject false certifications.
Other Issues
In addition to the attacks and secu-
rity issues described, solutions pro-
posed to combat free riding should 
consider some other issues. 
P2P network types and free riding. 
The type of P2P network can affect 
the network’s ability to implement 
free-riding solutions. For example, 
the applicability of widespread 
authentication and encryption 
is questionable because security 
mechanisms require “trusted” end-
points, which don’t exist in most 
unstructured, distributed P2P net-
works. Thus, P2P network devel-
opers should investigate which 
solutions are effective for which 
types of networks.
Evaluation methodology. Most mech-
anisms developed to combat free rid-
ing are verified through simulation 
models or game-theoretic approach-
es. These tools, however, are limited 
in analyzing peer behaviors and in-
teractions in a P2P network and in-
volve unrealistic assumptions. So, we 
must examine the proposed solutions 
in real environments using real P2P 
communities. In this way, we can 
better understand those solutions’ 
impact on P2P networks.
Solutions’ side effects. Dealing with 
free riding is a complex issue in P2P 
networks in which most peers are 
free riders. For example, a solution 
using traditional distributed systems 
techniques, such as detecting and 
disconnecting faulty peers from the 
network, might cause side effects, 
such as network vulnerability and 
partitioning.
F ree riding in P2P networks cre-ates problems that affect network 
operation on different levels. Even 
though existing P2P file-sharing 
systems might survive despite free 
riding, P2P network designers should 
take measures to improve P2P net-
works’ performance and robustness. 
If this does not occur, performance 
and widespread use of some P2P 
networks could become seriously 
degraded, and these networks might 
not even survive. Setting up incen-
tives, building reputations, and en-
forcing reciprocity are key research 
directions for enhancing contribu-
tion and preventing free riding in 
P2P networks. 
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